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Giancarlo Rolla 
The Two Souls of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms 
Introduction 
It is conventional wisdom that the acknowledgment and the safeguard of 
rights focusing on the protection and support of the human person are a 
result of constitutionalism, which rejects absolute government in favour of 
a system based on the rule of law. Provided that a system based on the rule of 
law is firmly founded on fundamental human rights, their safeguard and 
protection play an essential role in defining the essence of democratic legal 
orders: namely, they represent a condition for their existence. In other 
words, these rights turn out to be a key factor in the making of a 
constitutional system, since they contribute, along with other high-ranking 
principles, to establishing the constitutional values of a democratic country. 
An undeniable bond—both historical and cultural in nature—connects 
all constitutions currently in force to the ideals originating from those past 
revolutions that led to the recognition of such rights. Even so, plenty of 
changes have significantly affected the perception of human rights, as well 
as of their protective measures. Specifically, the most recent bills of rights 
have unique, distinctive elements, compared with traditional models. In our 
opinion, the most interesting feature is represented by a new and improved 
version of the personalism principle. 
If it is understood that the human person—together with the relevant 
need for protection—has always been regarded as the focus of modern 
constitutions, it is obvious that throughout the shift that moved away from a 
liberal system based on the rule of law towards a more socio-democratic 
system, the individualistic concept of the human person was gradually 
replaced by a more advanced notion, according to which the individual 
cannot be deemed as an isolated being, but as a participant of society and of 
community life. As a result, this adjustment in perspective determined an 
enhancement of the values on which constitutional bills are grounded: in 
other words, not only freedom and equality are to be considered 
fundamental, but now also dignity and solidarity must be awarded the same 
recognition. Therefore, the personalism principle gradually changed, in 
order to keep up with the system's evolution into a state based on the rule of 
law. 
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In the most long-standing liberal systems, charters acknowledged the 
existence of a society, where all citizens—in abstract—were considered 
equal. Also, they mainly regulated those legal institutions aimed at securing 
individual freedom (especially, habeas corpus, freedom of movement and 
trade, freedom of religion, private property, and the other so-called 
freedoms of the first generation). However, the later "welfare state" version 
of constitutionalism made possible a more socially oriented perception of 
the human being. As a result, all citizens have now become men and 
women, actual human beings with their own individuality. This 
development was achieved in various stages. Initially, all rights relating to 
the principle of freedom were associated with the principle of equality. 
Thus, civil rights were linked to both social rights and political rights. The 
principle of equality was granted constitutional priority, not only in 
connection with its formal aspect, according to which everyone is equal 
before the law, but also with respect to its substantial dimension. In fact, 
given the many actual forms of discrimination in society, public authorities 
are expected to step in and remove all obstacles that prevent true equality 
among individuals. As a result of this, social policy and active measures are 
given constitutional underpinning. 
Modern legal orders are increasingly aware that societies are now less 
homogeneous on account of pervasive economic, social, and political 
differences. Societies have also become more multiethnic and 
multicultural. Hence, the recognition of existing differences has become a 
matter of great interest. 
If it is obvious that humanity in general is fascinated by the idea that all 
people are created equal, it is just as evident that society as a whole brings 
out existing social differences. When such "non-equalities" are linked with 
episodes of historically- and socially-based discrimination, or with 
particular conditions that make some individuals more vulnerable than 
others, then they must be removed, as they are likely to develop into 
grounds for discrimination. When, on the contrary, such "non-equalities" 
have to do with differences that both help to promote personal growth, as 
well as help to constitute the identity of a group, then they must be deemed 
positive and pursued accordingly. 
Assuming the positive value of differences as the keystone of our 
argument, it follows that such "non-equalities" have to do with both the 
private and public aspects of each individual person's life. Indeed, 
according to Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, "the Republic recognizes 
andprotects the inviolable rights of each person, as an individual as well as a 
member of any social structure in which one expresses his or her 
personality." Both the private and communal aspects of human personality 
are clearly acknowledged in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Specifically, section 7 recognizes and safeguards the individual 
and natural degree of personal autonomy in making decisions of 
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fundamental personal importance, while section 27 acknowledges personal 
public involvement in larger social groups, which derive their well-defined 
individuality from commonly felt and historically reinforced ethnic, 
linguistic, and cultural factors. 
Acknowledging Universally Recognized Rights Together with 
Cultural Divergences: Conflict within the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms tries to expose the "two 
souls" possessed by each individual at once, in an attempt to bring them 
together and harmoniously combine them.1 
On the one hand, the Charter purports to establish a common platform of 
rights for all Canadian citizens, while on the other it tries to recognize the 
importance of Canada's multicultural nature, together with the current 
existence of indigenous communities holding inherent rights. Therefore, 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms concentrates on two different 
objectives: it aims to guarantee the same rights to every Canadian citizen, 
but at the same time it also tries to provide constitutional recognition for all 
ethnic identities living together in Canada's unified society.2 
Sections 2 to 12 of the Charter list several individual rights, including the 
freedom of religion, the freedom of expression, the right to assembly, the 
freedom of association, the right to bodily integrity and personal safety, the 
right to due process of law, and protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment. In addition, section 15(1) establishes the principle of 
non-discriminatory treatment before and under the law, while section 15(2) 
recognizes the legality of affirmative actions aimed at improving any 
disadvantageous condition of individuals or groups, should they be 
founded on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or 
mental or physical disability. 
However, several other sections of the Canada's Constitution Act, 1982 
(which includes the Charter) attempt to balance the protection of 
universally recognized human rights with rights that, instead, are 
acknowledged exclusively on account of shared cultural identity. This is the 
case, for example, with section 25 of the Charter and section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. These sections, respectively, provide that any 
pertinent treaty, right, and liberty cannot in any way be abrogated or 
derogated by way of the Charter and acknowledge the rights of the 
Aboriginal communities residing in Canada.3 In addition, section 27 
provides that "this Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians."4 
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There are also several general principles aimed at promoting the right 
balance between universally applicable rights and specific derogations in 
favour of definite groups: such is the purpose of the Charter's so-called 
"notwithstanding clause," contained in section 33, and the "reasonable 
limits" clause, contained in section 1, which can justify a law that otherwise 
violates one of the rights guaranteed under the Charter, because that law is 
acceptable in a "free and democratic society."5 
On this point, it is worthwhile to call attention to the argument that the 
free and democratic society clause implies acceptance of the principle of 
multiculturalism. As Justice Quigley held in a case examining the 
constitutional validity of Canada's "hate speech" laws, society can be 
regarded as free and democratic only when it acknowledges the principles 
of equality and multiculturalism.6 Likewise, the protection of the 
multicultural heritage constitutes a public interest, since racial tolerance is 
an essential ingredient for the good performance of a free and democratic 
society.7 
Further proof of this can be found in the 1989 Report by the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission. It stated that multiculturalism involves 
accepting existing differences and in recognizing that such differences are 
in themselves equal. All ethnic communities represented within Canadian 
society deserve equal dignity and worth. As a result, these ethical and 
political claims can be read as an interpretation of the constitutional 
principle of equality, as seen through the lens reflecting Canada's 
multicultural nature.8 The apparent conflict between the recognition of 
universally accepted rights and the protection of socio-historical 
differences has not been the only cause of friction within the Canadian 
constitutional order. Throughout Canadian history, when the country has 
been under stress, legislators and judges made a great effort to preserve the 
nation's stability. This was true during the struggle dividing the federal 
government and the provinces over their respective boundaries of 
legislative jurisdiction. The legal system has also been involved in settling 
differences deriving from historical antagonism between the 
English-speaking and the French-speaking communities. The latter 
disputes have resulted in progressively deteriorating interaction between 
the province of Quebec and the rest of the federation. Lastly, a degree of 
instability has been caused by economic differences, prompting Western 
provinces (such as British Columbia and Alberta) to constantly press the 
politically established and prominent central provinces, Ontario and 
Quebec, for greater political visibility. The Western provinces' increased 
economic power comes from the extensive use of their agricultural and 
natural resources, as well as surging population growth. 
As a result of these different reasons, the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms has set out on an ambitious quest: to combine the various 
elements making up social and institutional pluralism in Canada, in order to 
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develop a common federal law applicable to the entire country. According 
to this approach, then, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms seems to acquire 
a much greater institutional import and goes beyond the mere cataloguing 
of rights. It appears to be the keystone on which to build the country's unity, 
in light of universally recognized values, despite the fact that individuals 
living within Canada are linguistically, culturally, and economically 
different. Therefore, the Charter is supposed to serve as a channel for the 
integration of all social groups settled in different parts of the country. 
The Constitutional Recognition of the Right to Freely Express 
One's Lifestyle 
Keeping in mind the schema introduced at the beginning of this paper, one 
can view section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as 
specifically acknowledging the individualistic dimension that shapes each 
human being. This section provides that "everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."9 
The section is difficult to interpret and apply, as illustrated by the 
contradictory results reached, not only by legal theorists, but also by courts. 
At the outset, it is crucial to determine whether section 7 represents a 
procedural or a substantive safeguard.10 Should the latter be the chosen 
assumption, it is then necessary to determine the section's exact intent, thus 
revealing the precise meaning of the expressions selected. 
From the beginning ofthe Charterers,, certain authors regarded section 7 
as a procedural safeguard: in other words, it must be construed as the basis 
for procedural fairness.11 Legal commentators employed different 
arguments to come to this conclusion. First, they considered section 7's 
strategic placement within the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, where it is 
in fact the first section ofthe part relating to legal rights. Also, those authors 
resorted to a comparative analysis, as well as taking into account the 
constituent's original intent. 
Just as the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution sanctions that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law, it followed (for those Canadian authors) that section 7 provides for the 
abridgement of selected rights (rights to life, liberty, and security), as long 
as specific procedural safeguards, arising from the due process of law 
principle, are secured. 
Other authors seem to reach similar conclusions, even though their 
arguments pursue a different route, as they believe it is necessary to 
interpret the content ofthe Charter according to the constituent's original 
intent. In their opinion, based on examining the Charter's travaux 
préparatoires, the intention was never to confer on section 7 an innovative 
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function that would distinguish it jfrom what was stated in the Canadian Bill 
of Rights of 1960. Section 2(e) of the 1960 Bill of Rights provided that no 
law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to... deprive a person of 
the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice for the determination of his rights and obligations.12 
However, such interpretations of section 7, which restrict its scope to 
mere procedural fairness, have not been widely accepted. Originalist 
theories, which are popular in North America, though not commonly found 
in European legal literature, seem to ignore that eveiy constitution is a 
living tree—or "living law," according to the terminology employed by 
Italian legal theory. As a consequence, once its provisions have entered into 
force, they become part of the actual legal order, separate from the original 
legislator's intents. Theirmeaning is not necessarily the one assigned by the 
constitution-drafters, but rather the one that gradually derives from the 
application of legal principles and interpretative techniques. If this were not 
the case, the legal order would remain fossilized, and the law could not 
evolve together with society and customs. As stated by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in connection with the meaning of section 7, an evolving 
interpretation of the law is included in the inherent domain of the judiciary 
as guardian of the justice system.13 
In addition, a comparative analysis extending to other constitutions is 
still not entirely probative, since section 7 differs from section 2(e) of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960, as well as from the Fifth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. Specifically, while those earlier provisions consist of 
only one clause expressly dealing with a procedural safeguard (i.e., due 
process of law), the Canadian Charter introduces two separate and 
independent rights - the right to life, liberty and security, on one hand, and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice, on the other. As between the two, only the latter can 
be regarded as possessing an undeniable procedural connotation. By 
contrast, the importance of the former is purely substantial, in the sense that, 
even as life, liberty, and security are awarded their own, specific meaning, 
they simultaneously take part in safeguarding a common legal interest, 
namely, a special area of human privacy. 
In particular, the right to life protects a person through his or her entire 
course of life, from the moment one is granted legal personality, up until he 
or she is declared legally dead.14 The expression liberty, instead, does not 
cover only physical freedom (the traditional habeas corpus), but it also 
includes personal privacy. Specifically, the right to liberty embraces many 
different expressions of human individuality, which can be summed up in 
every person's right to freely determine his or her actions, and more 
precisely, to own a certain degree of autonomy in making decisions of 
fundamental personal importance, and in particular, a degree of personal 
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autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting their private 
lives.15 
Such profound autonomy or self-determination can be found, for 
example, in a woman's right to have control over her body, and therefore, 
over every stage of her pregnancy.16 Also, it can be detected in every 
individual's right to freely play a role in society, to see the world according 
to one's own opinion. Similarly, the right to liberty consists in the power to 
dispose of one's body, even if such right can be limited only as far as public 
interest will allow.17 
Lastly, the term security has typically been construed according to the 
definition provided by the World Health Organization, which recognizes 
the personal right to a state of complete physical, mental, and social 
well-being. In other words, the concept of security also refers to both 
physical and psychological well-being, thus making it possible to infringe 
on the right to security should a third party interfere with a person's privacy: 
such behaviour could affect psychological security, causing anxiety, stress, 
and emotional trauma. 
Obviously, section 7 of the Charter cannot be construed to the point of 
positively recognizing a constitutional right to benefit from the services 
supplied by a welfare state. It is readily understood that social rights—as 
they are subject to governmental discretionary power—are not absolute 
and therefore must be balanced with other constitutional principles and 
values. However, there is no doubt that by virtue of this constitutional 
provision, it is illegal for public powers to deprive anyone of a minimum 
level of economic comfort necessary to satisfy basic needs, because in such 
a case human dignity would most certainly be compromised.18 
Even though they are distinct, the three expressions of life, liberty, and 
security all originate from the more general notion of human dignity. As 
stated by the Canadian Supreme Court, section 7 involves the right to 
personal dignity and a right to an area of privacy or individual sovereignty 
into which the state must not make arbitrary or unjustified intrusions.19 
The principle by which human dignity has constitutional status allows 
for a double interpretation of its meaning: the first relates to a more 
individualistic context, while the second concerns social relations. The 
former is connected with the right to the respect and protection of one's 
reputation, that is, of one's good name, reputation and integrity. The latter 
can exist only if there is a social conscience aimed at preventing 
unavoidable social differences from being converted into reasons for 
exclusion or grounds for discrimination. By virtue of such right, it then 
follows that all persons must be granted the same respect, despite their 
different social position: in other words, they must be treated as an equal. 
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That is, the social environment must provide for relationships inspired by a 
natural duty of mutual respect.20 
Likewise, recognizing the equal dignity of groups only represents the 
other side of the need to prevent social discrimination. As Justice Iacobucci 
has clearly stated, the rule against discrimination is determined to prevent 
"the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the 
imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, 
and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law 
as human beings or as members of Canadian society."21 
Finally, the principle conferring equal dignity to all persons refers to both 
the individual, as well as to the group to which he or she belongs.22 
The Protection of Multiculturalism According to Section 27 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes an 
interpretative clause, by way of which the legislator may allow exceptions 
to be made with regard to the universalistic nature of specific rights, as long 
as said exceptions are reasonable, compliant with the principle of 
proportionality and aimed at promoting Canada's multifaceted ethnic 
mosaic. As a result, such provision acknowledges and promotes the 
country's "multicultural heritage," and indirectly, it also grants members of 
ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups the right to protect their cultural 
identity.23 
Many commentators, however, have criticized the final draft adopted by 
the drafters of the Charter. While some legal authors have argued that such 
constitutional clauses are poorly enforceable, as they merely add up to 
rhetorical flourish,24 others have found section 27 problematic because it is 
difficult to define the exact legal meaning of the expression multicultural 
heritage.25 Moreover, other commentators have drawn attention to the fact 
that section 27 is more important for its political value, rather than its legal 
impact, as it was included in the Charter in response to overwhelming 
pressure put on the government by associations representing different 
ethnic groups. 
Similar to the controversies surrounding the interpretation of section 7, 
legal and academic disputes about what is the legal significance of section 
27 are tumultuous. 
Indeed, there is no doubt that section 27 of the Charter does not list 
specific rights to cultural identity. On the contrary, it defines 
multiculturalism as an interpretative principle. In addition, section 27 is not 
even formally included among those parts of the Charter that establish 
various rights, but it is included in that "remedial" part that addresses how 
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the Charter shall be enforced. Therefore, it keeps company with the 
interpretation rules set forth by Sections 21, 22, 25, 26 and 29 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Nevertheless, section 27 is 
different from all other interpretation principles. First, it fulfills a protective 
role: it was in fact introduced in order to preserve the delicate institutional 
balance reached on the matter of aboriginal peoples, as well as of linguistic 
rights, of education and of multiculturalism. In addition, it has a 
constructive role, as it supposed to promote the enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage. Finally, it serves an instructive, though not 
self-executing, function. In fact it provides constitutional underpinning to 
the principle according to which Canadian uniqueness is determined by the 
contribution of several different cultures. In other words, the fact that this 
article can be listed among interpretation principles does not rule out the 
possibility of it having a significant impact in protecting multicultural 
identities and practices. 
First of all, section 27 identifies its main beneficiaries, that is, those who 
are obliged to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians. Courts are most certainly the main target; however, section 27 
appears to be intended for other recipients as well, should the Charter's 
interpretation be considered logically preliminary to its implementation 
and enforcement. 
Consequently, the duty to read the entire Charter according to the 
principle promoting Canadian multiculturalism must be taken on by the 
legislator (who must abide by such principle when passing specific laws or 
formulating general policies), as well as by all public authorities, when 
discharging their duty to implement supportive action. Indeed, 
multicultural heritage is a treasure that must be supported and protected 
against potential cultural assimilation and standardization. In view of this, it 
is worth noticing that the terms used so far - preserve, enhance - betoken an 
attitude opposed to the so-called melting pot policy. 
However, given its overall regulatory range, section 27 affects all 
individuals, as all private activities must not get in the way of the main 
constitutional objective, aimed at achieving the preservation and 
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians. 
With regard to its focus of attention, section 27 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms is an example of a so-called "open clause," which 
embraces unenumerated and unanticipated referents. In fact, it not only 
protects the cultural identity of the historically established minorities, but it 
stretches out to offer the same recognition to all the more recently 
immigrated communities, namely the "visible minorities." If this 
interpretation is correct, the constitutional meaning of multicultural 
"heritage" takes on a totally new dimension, as it applies to all the groups 
who, now and in the future, join in creating Canada's pluralistic society. It 
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suggests their active involvement in the foundation of the country's cultural 
heritage. This is a modern notion of "population": a continuous process in 
which individuals alternate and come after each other, generation after 
generation. 
Lastly, the concept of multicultural heritage of Canadians is not 
necessarily generic, nebulous, and hard to define. First of all, its meaning 
can be precisely determined by resorting to the connotation it has taken on 
in the international legal order, especially within the lines of decision of 
international courts and in international documents on the protection of 
community identity and ethnic minorities. It is natural, for example, to 
bring section 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
to mind, which indeed recognizes the right of all minority members to enj oy 
their culture, to profess and practice their religion as well as to speak their 
language. 
Besides, legal commentators can also apply so-called mediating 
principles, that is, descriptive principles derived from various scientific 
fields, such as the definition of culture found in Webster's Third New World 
Dictionary, according to which culture can be considered as "the body of 
customary belief, social forms and material traits constituting a distinct 
complex tradition of racial, religious or social group," and also as "that 
complex whole that includes knowledge, belief, morals, law, customs, 
opinions, religion, superstition." Other legal authors have instead drawn on 
sociological studies, according to which cultural heritage is a complex 
concept that involves the recognition of a rule against group discrimination, 
the acknowledgement of symbolic ethnicity (namely, the aspiration— 
shared by several individuals—to support the fundamental characteristics 
that set their identity and personality apart), as well as the recognition of 
structural ethnicity (that is, the existence of institutions and instruments 
aimed at protecting the group's stability, as well as preserving its identity 
against assimilating trends).26 
Until now, the interpretative principle set forth by section 27 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been used with extreme moderation. It 
is useful to look closely at the analysis by legal commentators as well as at 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
First of all, the Courts have employed the multicultural principle in an 
identifying effort, in order to define the scope and substance of several 
rights, especially of those specifically protected under section 2 of the 
Charter. 
With regard to religious freedom, section 27 corroborated the argument 
according to which a provision establishing Sunday as a holiday was 
discriminatory towards non-Christian religions and violated the duty to 
protect Canadians' multicultural heritage.27 Likewise, another case 
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revealed a similar approach, as the court stated that the support given to one 
element of the population of Canada by the Lord's Day Act is an 
unacceptable preference by the state for the religious beliefs of some 
Christians.28 
By contrast, the approach followed in connection with a province's 
Retail Business Act, which regulates which commercial activities could 
operate on Sundays, was quite different. In this context, the Supreme Court 
held that the multicultural principle did not authorize a Jewish storekeeper 
to do business on Sundays, even if the store had been closed on Saturday, as 
it disregarded the rules established by the Retail Business Act.29 
In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court was compelled to balance the 
security interests of the students and school staff with religious freedom. 
Even if it did not expressly refer to the multicultural clause established by 
section 27 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it did however allude to 
the multicultural principle, as it held that the total prohibition for Sikh 
students to wear the kirpan at school could not be regarded as one of the 
instances sanctioned by Section 1. 
On this matter, it is worth mentioning that the court justified its decision 
not to apply the said section for two different reasons: on one hand, it 
considered the measures chosen to limit religious freedom as not 
proportionate to the pursued objective, on the other it held that "a total 
prohibition against wearing a Kirpan to school undermines the value of this 
religious symbol and sends students the message that some religious 
practices do not merit the same protection as others." Consequently, the said 
message would ultimately question some of the very basic values upon 
which Canadian democracy and society are based, such as religious 
tolerance, respect for minorities, and multiculturalism.30 
Section 27 has also been employed by the Supreme Court in order to 
better define one's right to an interpreter during litigation. Specifically, the 
Court held that it would be discriminatory to restrict the interpreter from 
translating the entire civil proceedings, by using the defendant's mother 
tongue, whenever the defendant is a citizen of a different race and is unable 
to understand English.31 
Conversely, the Supreme Court did not regard section 27 as necessarily 
applicable in connection with the privileges awarded to certain religious 
groups, particularly with regards to educational issues. In fact, the court 
maintained that the multicultural principle could not have any effect on the 
exceptional provision contained in section 29 of the Charter, which, by 
derogating from the equality principle, protects the rights and privileges 
recognized to denominational, separate, or dissentient schools. In 
particular, the court held that the favourable treatment protected by section 
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29 could be regarded as one of the factors establishing the institutional 
compromise on which the Canadian federation is founded.32 
Although that opinion reflects the current Supreme Court doctrine, it has 
not won over all the judges on the court: a dissenting opinion claimed in fact 
that denying public funding to the schools belonging to minority religious 
groups is not simply economically detrimental, but it is also 
disadvantageous to the strengthening of one's own faith and multicultural 
heritage. 
By the same token, section 27 is ever more significant in connection with 
the anti-discrimination rule established by section 15(1) of the Charter. On 
the one hand, this provision must be read with the purpose of promoting the 
development of multicultural values. On the other, such values cannot be 
used as an excuse to encourage a discriminatory attitude towards other 
groups or individuals. For example, if the decision to finance positive 
actions in favour of cultural groups were approved, it would then be 
discriminatory to adopt rules that did not offer equal opportunities to all of 
them. Likewise, it would be discriminatory to adopt a piece of legislation 
that does not supply all ethnic groups with identical access to public 
services. 
On this matter, the Supreme Court pointed out that safeguarding 
multiculturalism requires prohibiting any kind of discrimination, even 
though indirect, and consequently it requested careful consideration of the 
effect that each rule has on the groups shaping Canada's ethnic mosaic. The 
court concluded that even unintended consequences determined by a 
specific rule can end up creating a case of discrimination.33 
Secondly, if one plate of the balance scale holds the principle of equality 
established by section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the other 
om must be occupied by the multicultural principle, so as to avoid that the 
possibility that both the legislator and the courts take "equality" to mean 
uniformity and homogeneity. As a result, these two principles establish a 
rule against difference in treatment and positive actions, should the said 
measures favour certain ethnic groups only. 
According to many commentators, combining the equality principle 
together with the multicultural principle rules out the possibility of 
adopting "assimilation" policy choices, as well as melting pot theories. It 
follows that section 27 substantiates the use of rules derogating from the 
equality principle. For example, even though teachers should be appointed 
on a merit basis, there is no constitutional prohibition for provisions that 
allow appointing them on the premise that a certain ethnic quota must be 
assured among the teaching personnel, given the unique, social 
environment in which the school operates. On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court has held that all issues having to do with culture hold a reinforcing 
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connotation, given that they have been awarded specific constitutional 
recognition.34 
Pointing this out is key for the management of modern, complex, and 
multiracial societies. Recognizing cultural diversity in these legal orders 
must be properly balanced and regulated in an attempt to ensure that each 
individual leads a peaceful and tolerant existence within society. In this 
way, the pluralistic perception of cultural groups comes to represent a 
reason for criticism towards a more liberal and more individualistic version 
of the equality principle: as one legal writer rightly stated, cultural equality 
goes through the recognition of cultural pluralism.35 
At the moment, however, the Supreme Court has not adopted the view 
according to which the multicultural heritage interpretative rule can act as a 
limitation on the exercise of freedom of expression, especially in cases of 
campaigns furthering racial or group hate. The court believes that freedom 
of expression constitutes a universally recognized right regardless of 
whether the cultural messages are truly acceptable. Therefore, the court 
held that punishing a teacher who had talked to his classroom about racist 
beliefs was unconstitutional,36 as was punishing a writer who, having 
denied in his book that the Holocaust had ever taken place, had been 
accused of spreading untruthful facts.37 
In this instance, however, it is important to take into account the 
dissenting opinion that was submitted by some of the Justices. They 
claimed that the limitation clause defending a free and democratic society 
was applicable to the case at issue, in light of the fact that racial tolerance is 
essential to a democratic society. 
Conclusion 
Given their role as pact between the citizens and the territories, charters are 
called on to create a common foundation of values, thus promoting a sense 
of belonging to the same political community. In pluralistic and 
multicultural societies, the said result may be achieved only by 
acknowledging both the traditional values pertaining to individual 
freedom, as well as the many and diverse values brought forth due to the 
multicultural nature of the country. To this purpose, the recognition of 
general rights—acknowledged by all Canadians "from coast to 
coast"—must be accompanied also by specific interpretation clauses, 
established for the protection and advancement of the various identities 
living within the same society. 
In so doing, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms takes into 
consideration both its past (that is, the inherent rights of Aboriginal groups), 
as well as its future (namely, the ethnic mosaic, in which several ethnic 
communities coexist). The Charter, however, also respects the "two souls" 
341 
InternationalJournal of Canadian Studies 
Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
that join together in making up modern human persons: that is, the 
individualistic identity and the group-belonging identity. 
For this reason, section 7 of the Charter should be construed together 
with section 27, in light of the fact that the former promotes the free 
development of human personality, while the latter acknowledges and 
enhances the various, multiple differences that make Canada a home of 
diverse communities. In between these sections and acting as balancing bar 
is section 15, which codifies the principle of equality: on one hand, it rules 
out any discriminatory consequences for individuals and for groups, while 
on the other it guarantees equal dignity to all human persons and to all 
groups. 
However today, 25 years after its adoption, the role played by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms with regard to the democratic 
development of Canadian society cannot be fully understood without 
taking into consideration the Supreme Court rulings. Specifically, the court 
holds the merit of having liberally interpreted and enthusiastically applied 
the Charter, thus indeed transforming it into a living tree, "capable of 
growth and development over time to meet new social, political, and 
historical realities often unimagined by its framers." 
From this perspective, the Supreme Court has truly been able to steer the 
development of the Canadian society and of its institutions, gliding through 
a river in which the two shores are represented by the values upheld by a 
modern, liberal and democratic society: namely, a high degree of personal 
autonomy, equal dignity to all people, cultural and identity pluralism, social 
relations based on tolerance, and a natural duty of mutual respect.38 
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